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Abstract
Background: Since 2000, results based financing (RBF) has proliferated in health sectors in Africa in particular,
including in fragile and conflict affected settings (FCAS) and there is a growing but still contested literature about
its relevance and effectiveness. Less examined are the political economy factors behind the adoption of the RBF
policy, as well as the shifts in influence and resources which RBF may bring about. In this article, we examine these
two topics, focusing on Zimbabwe, which has rolled out RBF nationwide in the health system since 2011, with
external support.
Methods: The study uses an adapted political economy framework, integrating data from 40 semi-structured
interviews with local, national and international experts in 2018 and thematic analysis of 60 policy documents
covering the decade between 2008 and 2018.
Results: Our findings highlight the role of donors in initiating the RBF policy, but also how the Zimbabwe health
system was able to adapt the model to suit its particular circumstances – seeking to maintain a systemic approach,
and avoiding fragmentation. Although Zimbabwe was highly resource dependent after the political-economic crisis
of the 2000s, it retained managerial and professional capacity, which distinguishes it from many other FCAS
settings. This active adaptation has engendered national ownership over time, despite initial resistance to the RBF
model and despite the complexity of RBF, which creates dependence on external technical support. Adoption was
also aided by ideological retro-fitting into an earlier government performance management policy. The main
beneficiaries of RBF were frontline providers, who gained small but critical additional resources, but subject to high
degrees of control and sanctions.
Conclusions: This study highlights resource-seeking motivations for adopting RBF in some low and middle income
settings, especially fragile ones, but also the potential for local health system actors to shape and adapt RBF to suit
their needs in some circumstances. This means less structural disruption in the health system and it increases the
likelihood of an integrated approach and sustainability. We highlight the mix of autonomy and control which RBF
can bring for frontline providers and argue for clearer understanding of the role that RBF commonly plays in these
settings.
Keywords: Political economy analysis, Results-based financing, Zimbabwe, Health financing reforms, Fragile and
crisis-affected settings
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Background
Over the last decade, results based financing (RBF) has
been increasingly implemented in low- and middle-
income countries to purchase health care services. These
schemes, often also called performance based financing,
typically aim to improve health services by providing bo-
nuses to service providers (usually facilities, but often
with a portion paid to individual staff ) based on the veri-
fied quantity of outputs produced, modified by quality
indicators. In many cases there is a division of functions
between regulation, purchasing, fund-holding, and ser-
vice delivery [1]. While research and evidence on RBF
has grown since the first systematic review [2], much of
the literature has focused on the health outcomes and
outputs of RBF [3–6], while less attention has been paid
to the drivers of policy and of how RBF is implemented
and rolled out under different conditions and settings.
This is important as there is controversy about effective-
ness and the health system effects of RBF programmes,
as well as the extent to which they are driven by external
agendas [7]. There is also evidence that RBF pro-
grammes are more common in fragile and conflict-
affected settings and that this may relate to the greater
role of external actors [8]. However, there are still few
case studies exploring these dynamics, in particular
based on FCAS experiences. Moreover, existing studies
have adopted a focus on agenda-setting and scale-up in
RBF programmes, rather than an explicit political econ-
omy framing [9–12]. One of the factors which has lim-
ited study in this area is likely to be its contentious
nature, particularly for those with a stake in the RBF
sphere.
In this article we examine the political economy of
RBF in Zimbabwe, asking, first, how historical leg-
acies, ideological values and framing influenced its
adoption; secondly, how roles, decision-making and
power relationships played out in relation to RBF’s
later implementation and evolution; and, thirdly, how
RBF has (or has not) shifted power and resources in
the Zimbabwe health system. The overall objective is
to understand the influence of the starting context,
institutions and actors on the programme’s develop-
ment and adoption, and, in turn, how the programme
shaped these factors. The case study is illuminating as
Zimbabwe is one of a small number of African coun-
tries where the programme is operating on a national
scale, and understanding its overall evolution can pro-
duce important lessons for funders and countries en-
gaged in or contemplating introducing RBF, as well as
for the wider research community. Political economy
analysis is recognized as an important tool to exam-
ine how formal and informal institutions influence
and are influenced by decision-making, power and re-
sources [13]. This article extends its application by
applying it to a health financing reform in a low-
income, fragile setting.
Methods
Study design
The case study is largely retrospective qualitative
case study, focusing on the period since 2011, al-
though drawing on insights into the health system in
Zimbabwe from earlier studies [14, 15]. It is based
on key informant interviews at national, provincial
and district levels, integrated with analysis of docu-
mentation (policies and strategies, project documents
and manuals, project evaluations, academic articles).
The research team also drew on their knowledge of
the policy environment.
The study is organised around a political economy
analysis (PEA) framework, which is suited to examining
the interaction of actors, context and resources (such as
power and financing). Table 1 presents the PEA themes,
which informed the questions which were used in the
topic guide, and were also used for analysis of interviews
and documents. These were adapted from a prior polit-
ical economy framework [16], with questions on framing
and recommendations added. The framework was
chosen as it is designed for broad analysis of sectoral
policies and probes the key variables of interest to this
study – the influence of institutions and actors’ position-
ing on the RBF programme, and in return, how it affects
their position. A set of questions on contextual factors –
particularly, historical legacies, ideologies and values,
and the framing of the RBF concept – explore how these
influenced the adoption of RBF (our first question). A
second set, more focused on actors, decision-making
and roles, explores RBF’s implementation (our second
question). Finally, we explore how RBF affected the dis-
tribution of resources in the sector (our third question)
– specifically, which actors gained or lost from its intro-
duction, and how it impacted on health financing, equity
and corruption. As the research area was relatively new,
the aim was exploratory, rather than starting from spe-
cific hypotheses.
Study sites
Data collection was done at national level and in two
provinces (Midlands and Mashonaland East), including
four districts (Murewa, Marondera, Gokwe North and
Gokwe South). These provinces were selected as they
were the site of the pilot districts for the first RBF
scheme in 2011. The districts were chosen as representing
one each from the two RBF schemes per province (the
World Bank programme and the Health Development
Fund (pooled donor)-supported RBF scheme) and includ-
ing the original pilot sites to gain the longest lens possible
on the RBF adoption and roll out.
Witter et al. Global Health Research and Policy            (2019) 4:20 Page 2 of 17
Document review
We searched for documents on RBF in Zimbabwe and
extracted data, using the political economy analysis
framework [16].
Documentary sources included the World-Bank
RBF website, the RBF Community of Practice, gov-
ernment’s websites, key informants from government
departments, donors and non-governmental organisa-
tions, including the implementers in Zimbabwe, Cordaid
and Crown Agents, as well as documents already
available to the team through long term engagement
in-country of the researchers. The documents in-
cluded the following:
 National Health Strategic Plans and health financing
policy documents
 RBF implementation/operational manuals
 RBF evaluations and reports
 Minutes and reports from meeting and working
group discussions
 Academic articles
 Datasets on RBF bonus payments and results
A snowball technique was adopted by checking
the references provided in the documents analysed
and retrieving further relevant documents. Similarly,
during key informant interviews, interviewees were
asked if they could share other relevant
documentation.
The documents date from the decade from 2008—i.e.
after the most acute period of crisis and prior to the
introduction of RBF in 2011—up till 2018. Some 60 doc-
uments were reviewed, the vast majority of which were
operational and grey literature.
Table 1 Political economy themes used in study
Domain Topic Questions posed
Context Historical legacies What is the past history of the sector, including previous health reform initiatives and experience of
crisis? How do these influence current stakeholder perceptions? How far did RBF respond to or reflect
these historical legacies?
Ideologies and values What are the dominant ideologies and values which shape views around the health sector? To what
extent did these influence the adoption of RBF? How have they been altered by it?
Framing of concept How was RBF portrayed by key stakeholders in the adoption phase? How did this framing change over
time? What is the dominant narrative behind RBF? Is there a consensus or disagreement on what it
means or how it is meant to work?
Actors Decision making How are decisions made within the health system in Zimbabwe? Who is party to these decision-making
processes? What role does evidence play? How are trade-offs managed? How were these reflected in
the adoption, adaption and implementation of RBF? Has RBF influenced these processes in turn?
Roles and power
relationships
Who are the key stakeholders in the health sector in Zimbabwe? What are the formal/informal roles and
mandates of different players? What is the balance between players at different levels of the health
system? To what extent is power vested in the hands of specific individuals or groups in relation to the
health sector in Zimbabwe? How do different interest groups outside government (e.g. private sector,
non-governmental organisations, consumer groups, the media) seek to influence policy? How were
these reflected in the adoption, adaption and implementation of RBF? Haw has RBF influenced these
roles in turn?
Donor roles and
coordination
What role have external development partners played in relation to the health system in Zimbabwe?
How well do they cooperate and coordinate? Do they always support national priorities? Do you think
they have their own political economy incentives to pursue particular approaches? How were these
reflected in the adoption, adaption and implementation of RBF? Has RBF influenced these processes in
turn?
Distribution of
resources
Support for reform Who were the “winners” and “losers” from RBF, at different stages? Who are its key champions? How
much political priority does RBF have and why? Who is resisting, and why?
Ownership structure
and financing
How is the sector financed? What is the balance between public and private ownership?
How did these feed into the adoption, adaption and implementation of RBF? How has RBF in turn
influenced ownership and financing in the sector?
Corruption and rent
seeking
Is there significant corruption and rent-seeking in the health sector? Where is this most prevalent (e.g. at
point of delivery; procurement; allocation of jobs)? Who benefits most from this? How is patronage be-
ing used? How were these reflected in the adoption, adaption and implementation of RBF? Has RBF in-
fluenced these processes in turn?
Service delivery Who are the primary beneficiaries of service-delivery? Are particular social, regional or ethnic groups in-
cluded or excluded? How are subsidies provided, and which groups benefit most from these?
How were these reflected in the adoption, adaption and implementation of RBF? Has RBF influenced
these equity outcomes in turn?
Institution-
alisation
Recommendations In order to make RBF effective and sustainable in this context in future, what would you recommend?
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Key informant interviews
Purposive sampling was used to identify key informants
(KI) at national, provincial and district levels, based on
their knowledge and involvement on RBF from its incep-
tion till the present. The selection of interviewees was as
comprehensive as possible, including individuals cur-
rently holding RBF-related posts or who were previously
in such positions. A number of relevant organizations,
groups and individuals involved in RBF were preliminar-
ily identified. New individuals were added based on the
results of the documentary review or as suggested by
key informants. Interviewees included representatives of:
 Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC):
Departments at central level, but also Provincial
Medical Directors, Provincial Health Executives and
District Health Executives (DHEs)
 Other relevant ministries and national organisations,
including the Ministry of Local Government and
Rural Development and the Zimbabwe Association
of Church-related Hospitals
 Donors/funders present and past: World Bank,
Health Development Fund (HDF) partners, the UK
Department for International Development and
European Union
 RBF implementers: Cordaid and Crown Agents
(two international non-governmental organisations),
at central and district levels; UNICEF (fund manager
for the HDF)
 Consultants and technical assistants who had
worked on RBF
The breakdown of key informants interviewed (40 in
total) is provided in Table 2. Eighteen MoHCC staff were
interviewed at national, provincial and district levels.
The development partner group was the next-largest
constituency, with 10 key informants. Overall, men pre-
dominated, reflecting gender discrepancies, particularly
at higher levels of the health system. For RBF implemen-
ters, by contrast, staff at central and field offices were
more commonly female.
Key informants were approached by email or tele-
phone, providing them with a brief explanation of the
research project. A time and date for an interview was
agreed upon. Before the interview, the researcher ex-
plained the study objectives and scope, and informed
consent was obtained in writing. Confidentiality was
assured. Consent was requested for recording, with
manual note-taking as a fall-back option where the re-
spondent was not comfortable with the conversation be-
ing recorded or where security arrangements or
technology did not permit recording. Twenty-six out of
40 interviews were recorded.
Key informants were interviewed in English, using
a semi-structured interview guide, structured around
the political economy analysis framework [16]. Most
interviews took place in the informant’s place of
work, but in a location where privacy was assured.
Some interviews were conducted by phone or Skype,
where physical distance or access necessitated it.
Interviews focused on the period from 2008 (prior to
RBF introduction) to present and were tailored to
the time available and the knowledge of the KI. In-
terviews lasted from 30 min to 2 h, with an average
of 1 h. The questioning was led by a senior re-
searcher, with a colleague assisting in taking notes.
Interviews took place from early February to late
March 2018.
Data analysis
Data analysis was done iteratively. A first thematic
analysis based on the PEA framework of the docu-
ments collected was conducted before the interviews
in the field, and guided the discussion during inter-
views. Later on, new documents were added to the
review, and a final thematic analysis [17] was con-
ducted of documents and interview transcriptions or
notes. Results of the analysis of documents and inter-
views were written-up together to allow for triangula-
tion and complementarity between data sources.
Some quotations are provided below to give texture
and substance to key points, although space does not
permit every point to be illustrated. All national and
international KI are described in the results as ‘na-
tional KI’ (working at national level), while those
from province, district and field offices are described
as ‘local KI’. This amalgamation of categories was
intended to protect anonymity, given the small pool
of potential participants.
Ethics
Ethical clearance was obtained from the Research Ethics
Panel of Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh, and
from the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe. The
study also received authorisation from the MoHCC.
Table 2 Key informants summary
Male Female Total
National MoHCC staff 5 0 5
Provincial health executives 3 3 6
District health executives 4 3 7
Other ministries and public bodies 1 2 3
Development partners 7 3 10
Consultants 3 0 3
Implementers 1 5 6
TOTAL 24 16 40
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Results
We start by presenting a brief overview of the policy
timeline and basic features of RBF design to frame
the results (Table 3). We then present results by
nine political economy themes adapted from the
framework, grouped into three clusters. We start
with contextual factors including the historical legacy
and its impact on the adoption of RBF, and how
ideologies and values influenced its adoption, evolu-
tion and framing. Next we focus on the role of
actors—their roles, power relations and influence on
the RBF decision-making. We then examine the how
RBF has influenced the distribution of resources in
the health system. Finally, we include some reflec-
tions to look to the future in relation to plans to
institutionalise RBF in Zimbabwe, incorporating
some of the recommendations of the KI.
Policy timeline and RBF design
RBF started in July 2011, initially in two front-runner
districts of Marondera and Zvishavane, then in an add-
itional 16 districts, with funding from the World Bank and
implemented by Cordaid (Table 3). The RBF programme
pays for 16 indicators at primary health unit (PHU) level
and five at referral level [18], with additional payments
based on quality scores. It is focused on rural areas, cover-
ing all 60 rural districts and two urban districts [18], with
the cities of Harare and Bulawayo excluded. This was
scaled up to all rural facilities in 2014, with funding for the
other districts from the pooled Health Transition Fund
(HTF), a multi-donor fund established in 2011 to support
the Government of Zimbabwe to reduce maternal and
child mortality, which later became the Health Develop-
ment Fund (HDF). This RBF programme was implemented
by Crown Agents, with funds managed by UNICEF.
Table 3 Timeline for RBF adoption, piloting and scale up
Date Key events
2008 Peak of political/economic crisis in Zimbabwe
2009 Government of National Unity (GNU) takes power. 2009–13 National Health Strategy lays
out plan for post-crisis recovery
2008–10 World Bank engages the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) in discussion of RBF
July 2011 Pilots start in two ‘front-runner’ districts. National RBF steering committee established.
January 2012 The Health Transition Fund (HTF) provides pooled donor support to maternal, newborn
and child health and health system strengthening – paying allowances to key staff,
purchasing essential drugs and equipment, fixed amounts to rural health centres (RHCs)
($750 per quarter per clinic) across the country
March 2012 RBF pilot scaled up to 18 districts (two per province), managed by Cordaid and funded
by the World Bank. First programme implementation manual (PIM) developed. Indicators
focused on maternal and child services in primary clinics (public and mission sectors) but
with support to referral facilities for specific indicators.
HTF continues to support all districts with equipment, medicines and retention
allowances but stops financial support to RBF clinics (fixed allowance continues to
remaining 42 districts).
2012 World Bank Technical Review undertaken; first RBF price adjustment
2013 Mid-term review of Cordaid programme; prices adjusted for some indicators; quality
bonuses shift to threshold-based system; greater weight given to clinical quality in
quality checklist
2014 HTF adopts output-based model in 42 districts for primary care units only (because of
resource constraints, district hospitals continue to receive fixed amounts in the 42 districts).
UNICEF launches tender for implementation, which Crown Agent wins. Cordaid shares its
model and helps to train staff in the 42 new districts.
2016 Impact evaluation of RBF in 18 districts shared23, 52. Zimbabwe hosts global RBF workshop,
with World Bank support. Quality checklist revised.
HTF transitions to Health Development Fund (HDF).
2017 Review of indicators and quantity/quality weighting, following health system assessment
(focusing on RBF, human resources and pharmaceuticals). Staff bonus is linked to quality
scores. Technical working group for sustainability established. Prices for indicators drop
due to budget constraints.
November 2017 Political upheaval and start of ‘new dispensation’ led by Emmerson Mnangagwa.
2018 Institutionalisation plan aims to shift functions from external contractors to the Project
Coordination Unit in MoHCC for 18 districts in 2018. MoF contribution to funding
increased. District hospitals to be included in RBF programme for all districts.
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Context
Historical legacies
The context was key to the adoption of RBF in
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe experienced a severe economic
and social crisis, which peaked in 2008 and is still on-
going (see Table 4 on health care provision and financing
in Zimbabwe). Zimbabwe’s dramatic economic collapse
during the 2000s led to loss of skilled health personnel,
lack of investment in health and chronic shortages of
essential drugs and equipment [25]. Inadequate public
financing resulted in introduction of formal and informal
user charges that further restricted access to health care
particularly for women and children. In 2008, the health
system was close to collapse.
Failing to take up of life saving interventions and poor
quality of care contributed to the reversal of key health
indicators. What had once been a well-functioning
health system entered a period of rapid decline. Most
external assistance focused support on disease spe-
cific interventions in particular against HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. Yet Zimbabwe still had a
residual skilled workforce, an underused health infra-
structure and strong policy frameworks to improve
maternal and child health and address underlying
system weaknesses [26].
In 2009, a hundred day plan was developed to revital-
ise health services by the Government of National Unity.
To mobilize resources, the Ministry developed and
launched the Health Sector Investment Case in March
2010, which gave birth to the Health Transition Fund
(HTF). The HTF was a multi-donor fund focused on
strengthening the health system and ensuring access to
health services in particular for pregnant women and
children under five. HTF engaged to pay basic salaries
throughout the country and ensure basic drugs supply
and equipment. It aimed to revive what was described as
a ‘completely comatose health system at the time …. It
was more profitable to sell tomatoes than work as a pro-
fessional in health facilities at that time’ (national KI).
In this context, the World Bank arrived with an offer
of $15 million, which was conditional on using an RBF
mechanism. As Zimbabwe was in arrears with its inter-
national debt payments, it was not eligible for regular
International Development Association loans, and so the
Health Results Innovation Trust Fund, which supports
RBF approaches, was the only funding vehicle the World
Bank could offer.
‘There was no scope for negotiation as the Bank could
only offer this kind of grant. The health system was
very cash-strapped so it was hard for them to negoti-
ate. There was only one offer on the table. It was a
non-decision on both sides’ (national KI)
The Ministry and other donors were initially distrust-
ful of the RBF approach, but there was an urgent need
for resources. At this stage, the Ministry was deeply
donor dependent. Many programme staff were funded
by development partners. Planning meetings were de-
scribed as ‘just rituals’ by one sub-national KI.
‘We were very poor on donor coordination. This came
when there was a crisis and no-one dared to tell them
to sit down and do things properly’ (local KI).
Despite the crisis, there remained a legacy of the pre-
crisis stronger system and a resistance to a model which
Zimbabweans saw as designed for countries with weak
(or no) health systems. There was resistance to parallel
programmes and confidence that with resources, the
Zimbabwean health system could deliver. On this basis,
Table 4 Background on health care provision and financing in
Zimbabwe
The public sector is the main provider of health care services [19].
Health care in Zimbabwe is delivered through 1848 facilities, most of
which are public health care facilities (the largest category being the
rural district council-run primary facilities). The rest are non-profit and
church affiliated facilities (referred to as mission facilities), private
for-profit facilities and company operated clinicsa. Municipalities also
fund and provide primary health care services in their areas. These
health facilities are separate from those directly administered by the
MoHCC. Local councils generate revenue through local taxes, levies and
other fees.
During the crisis, health financing collapsed, resulting in 0.02% of GDP
in 2009 for MoHCC expenditure [20]. User fees picked up the gaps,
rising from 23% in 1999 to 62% of total health expenditure in 200531.
Over the same period, health insurance payments are reported to have
collapsed from 20% to less than 1 % of total health expenditure.
However, by 2010, out of pocket payments had reduced to 39%, which
was still well above the 20% maximum level prescribed by the World
Health Organisation [21].
In 2015, government expenditure on health as a proportion of total
government expenditure was approximately 8%, an increase on
previous years but still low for the region [19]. Household payments
accounted for around 25% of total health expenditures in 2015, of
which 95% were out of pocket. In Zimbabwe, 7.6% of all households
incurred catastrophic health payments in 2015; the incidence of
catastrophic health payments was highest among households in the
poorest quintile [19].
Donor funds provided roughly a quarter of total health expenditure,
according to the 2015 national health accounts data. However, pooled
funding comprised only 7% of donor funding while non-pooled funding
made up the bulk of funding [22] and 90% of external aid to the sector
came from ten partners, which creates risks [23]. Estimated costs for a
medium-scenario package of care were $94 per capita in 2018, as
against expected public resources of $52 per capita [23].
There is evidence of internal pressure for increased public commitments
to health – Parliament held up the 2018 budget until the health
allocation was increased - however, it remains low, with only one third
of the amount needed by the sector funded [24], at around $27 per
capita. Health’s allocation as a share of total government budget has
remained within the range of 7–10% since 2010 [24].
aThere are 101 private health facilities and 87 mission facilities. Mission and
private health facilities provide only primary and secondary care. Mission
facilities are partly funded by the MoHCC through salary, administration and
capital grants. 68% of services in rural areas and 35% nationally are delivered
by mission facilities
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the MoHCC opposed piloting and argued for quick scale
up to two districts per province (in 2012).
‘The World Bank wanted to pilot in two districts but
we argued that the principles and ideas were not new
to Zimbabwe. We needed resources and would work
hard so it would definitely work’ (national KI)
This self-confidence, despite crisis and dependency,
ensured that adaptations were made to the RBF model,
which fitted it to the Zimbabwean context. Initially, the
MoHCC resisted paying staff incentives as it felt these
would undermine professionalism and might cause dis-
tortions in the labour market. However, given the low
salaries, the need for staff motivation became clear and
permission to allocate 25% of facility RBF payments to
staff was given in 2013. The MoHCC also did not agree
to giving the PHUs the power to hire and fire staff –
which would have fitted with a ‘pure’ approach to pro-
vider autonomy within the RBF model, but hiring was
seen as a centralised function and important to main-
taining a systemic approach. The MoHCC placed great
stress on the role of the Health Centre Committees
(HCCs) and insisted on the need for district RBF steer-
ing committees in order to integrate RBF within wider
planning and coordination mechanisms. One KI de-
scribed their philosophy as ‘guided democracy’ (national
KI) – in other words, achieving a balance between allow-
ing facilities to set their own priorities and keeping a
system with coordination and oversight.
As the World Bank funds could not go directly to the
government, given the arrears with international institu-
tions, Cordaid managed the RBF funds and modifica-
tions were made to allow government financial
contributions to be paid to it as the implementing
agency, which is very unusual for RBF schemes inter-
nationally. Public financial management rules also had
to be changed to allow PHUs to open bank accounts.
They had previously had virtual accounts at district level,
with funds paid in from the Health Service Fund (a fund
for retention and use of fees and revenues at district
level since 1996), but these were managed by the
district.
Many in the system saw RBF as a way of reviving the
existing public system. Structures which existed but
were not fully operational, often for resource reasons,
were supported – for example, district supervision and
the Health Centre Committees.
In summary, the adoption and adaption of RBF was
strongly shaped by the historical legacy of Zimbabwe’s
relatively high performing health system, but also its al-
most total collapse during the economic crisis, which
started in the late 1990s and is on-going. These and the
political relationships between the post-colonial Mugabe
government and international partners influenced RBF
directly, and also indirectly through ideological channels,
which are discussed next.
Ideologies and values
Initial resistance to the RBF concept was fuelled in part
by the public service ethos within the health sector, al-
though this had been eroded during the crisis years. In
particular, there was resistance to reforms which threat-
ened equity, which had been a strong health policy
thrust in Zimbabwe post-Independence.
As the programme became more embedded however,
there was an appreciation of how it delivered financial
resources to lower levels, though some report the health
system to have remained very hierarchical with limited
providers’ autonomy.
Over time, local actors have been exposed to and have
in part absorbed the ideology and values of the RBF
community, which emphasise ‘core principles’ of RBF,
such as the separation of functions. Repeated exposure
to SINA courses1 and strong RBF champions over the
years has played a role in embedding RBF concepts in
key leaders. However, debates about the ‘purity’ of the
RBF model (based on the SINA-defined ideal) in
Zimbabwe continue - in 2017, a MoHCC team report-
edly analysed the ‘purity’ of their RBF model according
to the SINA principles and concluded that it needed
‘purifying’. For example, risk-based verification, which
was then under development in order to reduce manage-
ment costs, was considered unacceptable. Equally, the
planned institutionalisation of RBF within the Project
Coordination Unit (a semi-independent unit set up in
the MoHCC to manage Global Fund programmes) was
considered insufficiently separate from the MoHCC
‘regulator’. The mix of verification and payment under-
taken by Cordaid (and later Crown Agents) was also
considered unacceptable, as was any form of pooled
procurement. However, importantly, the variation in the
RBF design in Zimbabwe can be seen as part of a suc-
cessful adaptation to context, as highlighted above and
by key informants.
‘There was a big debate about the autonomy of health
facilities. The Soeters model [as outlined in SINA
courses] sees health facilities as stand-alone, not part
of a system. But Zimbabwe sees health facilities as
part of a system. We agreed to meet half-way: facilities
can develop their own operational plans, but according
to targets given by higher levels. They are also guided
in how to use the funds’ (national KI)
In summary, the RBF model that emerged in
Zimbabwe had to manage two, somewhat competing,
ideologies - one emphasising an integrated system, the
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other a system in which roles and functions are distinct
and actors have contractual relationships with one
another.
Framing of concept and its evolution over time
A proposal to the World Bank from the MoHCC for
pay for performance in 2008 focused on the retention
of staff and framed RBF under that angle, but it also
highlighted the risks of market distortion which earl-
ier schemes to retain specific groups of staff, or staff
in specific districts (such as targeted allowances), had
caused [27]. This aversion to distortion of the labour
market led to a delay in the health worker incentive
component within RBF; this only came in in 2013,
and even then, some facilities chose not to pay indi-
vidual health staff incentives but to use funds for col-
lective goods, like food, at least initially.
‘Any retention schemes should feed into the pool and
cover approved health workers with a possibility of
reviewing existing scales upwards for all health
workers rather than a targeted approach that destroys
the teams at various levels’ [27]
As well as recognising the need to address poor health
indicators, the MoHCC required resources and had con-
fidence that the health system would use them well, par-
ticularly if they were delivered to frontline providers. It
was not anticipating the need for new approaches at this
stage – not perceiving RBF as a health system reform ap-
proach, but rather seeking investment. As a conse-
quence, the issue of resources has continued to be
important in the way RBF is perceived locally – though
with dropping budgets for RBF in 2017/18, concerns
have been emerging.
‘The main issue has been keeping funding high enough.
The recent drop in earnings has been very high – from
$10,000 per quarter to $2,000 per quarter for some.
This is a big shock’ (national KI)
RBF was later presented and perceived as an enactment
of the wider government Result-Based Management
(RBM) programme, which had been launched in 2005,
but never implemented due to lack of resources [28] .
RBM aimed to make all ministries more results-
driven and included, in theory, results-based budget-
ing, personnel management, monitoring and evalu-
ation, and management information system. Although
quite distinct from RBF as later practiced in the
health sector, it provided an ideological justification
for it – what one KI called ‘ideological retro-fitting’.
RBF is now seen as testing the RBM approach, which
is also of interest to other sectors.
For others, such as higher level staff conducting pri-
vate practice, the perception was that RBF was no differ-
ent to their medical insurance work.
In summary, RBF was framed in different ways at dif-
ferent stages, including as an approach to motivate staff,
as a way of resourcing the sector, as part of a wider
transformation to results-orientation in the public
system, and as a minor variation on a familiar fee-for-
service payment mechanism. These views reflected not
just contextual factors, as discussed, but also the pos-
ition of different actors, which we now turn to.
Actors
In this section, we analyse the position of the various ac-
tors on the issue of RBF, their roles and power relations,
how this influenced decision-making processes, as well
as how actors’ positions on RBF have shifted over time.
Decision-making
The MoHCC is a key player for technical decisions on
health, though politics overrides when high profile issues
arise. The MoHCC initially proposed that the World
Bank focused on financing of PHC services, including
village health workers, and providing basic inputs to
rural health centres and district hospitals [29]. There
followed a period of internal debate before RBF moved
ahead, which involved give and take by both sides – the
MoHCC took on board the concept, but the World
Bank also had to alter its design to fit the needs of
Zimbabwe. This careful adaptation was reported to lead
to better ownership by the MoHCC over time.
The Provincial Medical Directors were seen as a key
interface between policy and practice. The RBF
programme worked closely with them from the start.
Convincing them was seen as key to getting buy-in from
the MoHCC. RBF offered additional resources but its
potential to shift control was also recognised.
‘The districts and provinces were advocates for RBF
but maybe because of the resources’ (national KI)
Development partners (apart from the World Bank)
were initially sceptical, reflecting divided international
opinions on RBF and seeing RBF as mainly a World
Bank project. However, they were won over by early evi-
dence (from RBF reports on service utilisation) that RBF
facilities were performing better. The HTF was report-
edly persuaded to join by a mix of MoHCC enthusiasm,
and local and international evidence. There was however
a feeling of over-hyping of evidence and a lack of object-
ivity in how early results were reported, according to
some key informants. Although an impact evaluation
was conducted [30], the expansion of the scheme did
not wait for these results (expansion took place in 2012
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and 2014, with impact evaluation results only shared in
2016). A key driver from the facility side was enthusiasm
with the increase in funds which RBF facilities were
earning, compared to districts which were still receiving
fixed-rate inputs (pre-2014).
Later iterations of the RBF policy do reflect use of
programme evidence – for example, the prices of indica-
tors and their weights were adjusted over time to ad-
dress areas of over- and under-performance, although
these decisions are complex and so the role of external
experts has been prominent in the decisions of the
National RBF Steering Committee.
Roles and power relations
The National RBF Steering Committee (NSC) provides the
overall leadership for RBF. It is co-chaired by the MoHCC
(Principal Director, Preventive Services) and a lead
development partner and includes the Ministry of
Local Government (which manages all public infra-
structure), civil society, Ministry of Finance, mission
institutions and development partners. However, key
informants expressed mixed views on the extent to which
the MoHCC provided leadership in the committee. Some
felt that it was mainly agreeing to changes which had been
pre-prepared by external players.
‘Ownership and leadership were there – it was chaired
at a high level – but there was limited follow-through.
In the early years, it depended on the World Bank and
partners’ (national KI)
Others highlight that Zimbabwe has exceptional own-
ership in the RBF process compared to other countries.
The MoHCC clearly has veto power. However, the com-
plexity of RBF design and management contributes to a
technical ‘black box’ which some NSC members struggle
to engage with.
‘There is a pretence at participatory meetings, then
they go back to hotel rooms and do things on their
own … Results are presented in such a complex way
that no-one can engage with them’ (national level KI)
Since its initiation, Cordaid provided the secretariat
for the NSC, which was presumably more active early in
the process, but by 2016, meetings were no longer very
frequent, with the minutes referring to the ‘urgent need
to kick start the RBF NSC’ [31]. The membership was
also large, which may have been a factor in efficient and
informed decision-making (with 38 people listed in mi-
nutes from 2016). According to key informants, it has
been challenging to gather committed members, willing
and able to attend regularly and spend time to study the
issues scheduled for debate.
RBF is embedded in an MoHCC hierarchy which is
well respected, with communications going from the
MoHCC to Provincial Medical Directors, then DHEs.
‘In the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo], donors
give instructions to facilities, but here systems are well
established. This means that we are not running a
parallel system. Implementers have to work closely
with the Ministry of Health’ (national KI)
Districts were especially important, planning services
and managing resources on behalf of PHUs. Under RBF,
there was a potential for their purchasing and resource
management role to be reduced, however, the MoHCC
insisted that District Medical Officers needed to approve
the operational plans drawn up by PHUs, and in prac-
tice, most respondents did not feel that RBF had intro-
duced a large shift in the balance of power in the health
system, but had rather helped to support traditional
roles.
The governance of the RBF programme was linked to
existing local governance structures, such as provincial
and district development committees, and the District
Health Team, which coordinates across sub-sectors
within health.
Development partner roles increased post-crisis, fo-
cussed on preventing the collapse of the primary care
system. In relation to RBF, there was an initial diver-
gence between the HTF and the World Bank, but the
HTF later (in 2014) agreed to fund the same model, with
the encouragement of the MoHCC. The World Bank
was seen as poor in communicating with other partners
in the sector, and there have been continued problems
of coordination and information sharing between part-
ners in general.
Seen from other side, some development partners felt
that stronger MoHCC leadership could have helped en-
force greater harmonisation, including on data analysis
and sharing.
There was some discomfort about international non-
governmental bodies, such as the RBF implementation
agencies, ‘verifying’ MoHCC work, which led to a more
neutral language of ‘field officers’ being used for the
Cordaid and later Crown Agents staff, who do indeed
provide a wider range of roles than simple verification
(also providing training, mentoring and wider support to
facilities and districts).
A summary of the main actors and their positions on
RBF over time is provided in Table 5. It appears that the
adoption of RBF was predominantly influenced by senior
staff in the MoHCC at national and provincial levels, in
interaction with key partners. Thereafter the RBF Steer-
ing Committee was formally in charge, though some-
times more in a veto position than in the driving seat.
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RBF was supported by the existing governance struc-
tures but within a landscape marked by some tensions
over coordination with, and between, development
partners.
Distribution of resources
In this section, we examine how different stakeholders
were affected by RBF, followed by its impact on health fi-
nancing and ownership, on corruption and rent-seeking,
and on equity of service delivery.
Gains from reform
In assessing which groups in the system have gained or
lost from RBF, the main beneficiaries, as perceived by
most KIs, have been the PHUs, which have gained in au-
tonomy over some routine resource management, al-
though this also comes with considerable restrictions
and controls over how funds are spent – controls im-
posed both by the RBF model but also the national pub-
lic financial management rules.
In terms of amounts of funding received, PHUs with
larger catchment areas have benefited – they previously
received $750 per quarter from the HTF, whereas after
RBF, amounts ranged from $700 to $4000 per quarter in
one district visited by the research team, and were
mainly dependent on population size, which varied sub-
stantially from 1000 to 15,000 per health centre.
‘Low performance goes hand-in-hand with low catch-
ment populations’ (local KI)
There were concerns about the drop in prices for indi-
cators in 2017. Facilities were concerned that they would
no longer be able to manage with these lower prices,
given continuing limited support from the central
budget.
Hospitals in most districts (in the 42 Crown Agents/
HDF-supported districts) did not receive RBF payments
before 2018, and by contrast with PHUs were in a very
poor financial and material state [22]. RBF hospitals (in
Table 5 Summary of key actors’ positions on RBF over time in Zimbabwe
Actors Initial position on RBF Evolution of position over time
Ministry of Health Initial distrust and lack of knowledge
about RBF
Key managers at national level take ownership, though residual
concerns remain about it being another ‘vertical’ approach;
resistance is also felt from programme managers uninvolved
in RBF.
Provincial Medical Directors and DHEs appreciate it as bringing
supportive resources and tools
PHUs gain relatively flexible resources, although are concerned
about fall in budgets and intensive procurement procedures;
hospitals have not benefited significantly to date though the
policy is now being extended to district hospitals in all areas.
Staff at PHUs benefited from incentives but have some concerns,
especially over how they are distributed internally.
Ministry of Finance Thought to be supportive of this as
enabling an (adapted) trial of results
based management
The MoF has supported RBF with some co-financing in the World
Bank-supported districts; may be interested to extend to other
sectors; however, the on-going resource squeeze is a major
constraint.
Communities No prior exposure Communities have benefits from important inputs in the quality of
care at PHU level, though effects on financial protection are not
so clear.
HCCs have gained from acquiring resources to manage; however,
wider links with and accountability to communities continue to be
limited.
Development partners Most development partners initially
perceive this as a World Bank project;
some early resistance to the approach
Gradually won over by what seem to be promising early results;
later support roll-out, though there are concerns about the model
being ‘over-sold’ by a number of development partners. They see
gains as the result of a wide range of system-supporting interventions
which happened concomitantly.
The World Bank is able to portray RBF as successful, although its
own impact evaluation is more mixed.
Implementers Cordaid had long-standing expertise
on operating RBF and was an advocate.
Crown Agents was initially less experienced.
Cordaid remains supportive of RBF and is supporting institutionalisation
in its districts.
Crown Agents has gained experience of RBF and continues to
operate the policy in HDF-supported districts, with UNICEF
continuing as fund manager.
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Cordaid/World Bank-supported districts) on average re-
ceived 136% more revenue per quarter than non-RBF
hospitals [22]. District hospitals in HDF districts were
therefore looking forward to moving to an RBF-based
system in 2018, although their expectations remained
dependent on adequacy of the RBF budget.
A condition for receiving RBF funds was the removal
of fees for maternal and child care, and this caused
problems for some sub-sectors such as the Rural District
Councils, which used to collect revenues from their
health facilities. However, most had agreed in the end to
remove them in order to join the scheme.
Staff at PHUs have generally benefited from having
the funds and materials to work with, as well as bonuses.
This was reflected in the impact evaluation, which found
higher levels of job satisfaction and autonomy in RBF fa-
cilities, compared with non-RBF facilities [30].
‘The work environment improvement and ability to
make decisions at their level is what motivated health
staff. Rural health workers were also more cognisant of
the work they had to do’ (local KI)
However, there were concerns about their distribution.
The distribution of the 25% of RBF payments to staff fol-
low hierarchy and attendance and covers all staff,
whether working on maternal and child health services
or not. This aims to reinforce teamwork but caused
some resentment – for example, the Environmental
Health Practitioners receive bonuses, but many of their
colleagues do not perceive their contribution as they are
not facility-based. Some facilities also informally pass on
benefits to Village Health Workers who bring in clients.
While RBF facilities reported significantly higher au-
tonomy in financial allocation, there was less difference
in autonomy on allocating tasks to staff [30]. Staff in
RBF facilities were not any more satisfied with career de-
velopment factors, such as opportunities for promotion,
than staff in non-RBF facilities. In addition, staff in RBF
facilities had low motivation, mainly because of issues
which are largely unrelated to RBF, such as teamwork,
the work environment, recognition and the leadership of
the facility. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the
relative proportion of incentives for their tasks and slow
disbursements. Higher workload and consequent burn-
out was also a source of dissatisfaction [30]. The evalu-
ation also found that staff were demotivated because
DHE supervision was focused on fault finding and
lacked confidentiality.
From the patients’ perspective, RBF contributed to
greater drug and staff availability, as well as infrastruc-
ture improvements (such as mother’s waiting homes,
which many facilities built using RBF funds, with wider
community support). Client satisfaction with antenatal
services in RBF facilities improved with regard to the re-
spectfulness of health staff in the World Bank evalu-
ation; however, the same improvement was also
observed in the control (non-RBF) facilities [30]. The
amount of time clients spent waiting to be seen was rea-
sonable in the RBF facilities, better than in the control
facilities, and trust in the skills and abilities of the health
workers’ also improved. Fees for maternal and child
health care have been reduced [32] and mother and
child health indicators have improved from their low
point during the crisis [33]. However, it is important to
recognise that this is the result of a wide range of donor
support for reproductive, maternal and health and pri-
mary health care systems over the period, not just RBF.
RBF also strengthened the role of the Health Centre
Committees, enabling a switch in focus from resource
mobilisation to resource allocation [34], though many
challenges remain in developing community awareness
and engagement and ensuring the effectiveness and sus-
tainability of Health Centre Committees [30, 32, 35].
Divergent views were expressed on the effects on
higher level managers in the health system – some felt
that they had lost control but others that they had
gained more strategic oversight.
Large programme managers in the MoHCC continued
to purchase independently and had not been included in
the RBF approach in any case. For those who have taken
a more central role in the oversight of RBF, there have
been many intangible pay-offs in the form of attendances
at RBF trainings, study tours and conferences, with the
prestige of Zimbabwe being presented as a high per-
former in the RBF world (in 2016, the global RBF work-
shop was hosted in Harare, with an opportunity to show
case the country’s experience).
For provincial and district level managers, RBF provided
some resources to support their work but the payments
did not link very closely to performance, being more
linked to routine activities to support the programme.
‘How motivating is it for DHEs and PHEs? There is
lots of work but limited reward. So motivation needs
to be intrinsic – wanting to be able to present good
results in provincial review meetings, for example’
(national KI)
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) was said to be a key
champion from the start, perhaps because RBF allowed
for some level of testing of the RBM concept, previously
introduced but not implemented due to lack of re-
sources. This support was signalled by government co-
funding, which started with $1 m in 2015. This increased
to $10 million in the 2018 budget. However, the MoF
was reported to be sceptical of the staff incentives com-
ponent, which is not practiced in other sectors.
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‘It took a while to get the funds but was seen as a
signal. The MoH struggles to get any money from the
MoF!’ (national KI)
From the World Bank perspective, Zimbabwe provided
a rapidly scaled up and relatively well managed RBF
programme as a demonstration model, although with
the shift from the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
to the Global Financing Facility, the conditionality linked
to results-based approaches appears to have softened. As
a national KI commented, ‘It may be possible to move
away from the blueprint now’.
Other international agencies have also benefited from
RBF, including the fund manager for the HDF scheme,
UNICEF, which plays multiple roles, including drug pro-
curement on behalf of donors. There is some resentment
locally about this by-passing of government systems, and
complaints that there is no transparency on overhead
costs charged by UN agencies.
‘No multi- or bilateral donors could give [funds] to the
state – that led to the Republic of UNICEF’ (national
KI)
Other important players include the implementation
agencies – Cordaid and Crown Agents – which were
contracted to manage RBF in 18 and 42 districts respect-
ively. The MoHCC was initially distrustful of Cordaid
but came to appreciate their support. Crown Agents was
later able to benefit from Cordaid’s greater prior expert-
ise in RBF and the two organisations have cooperated
well in general, sharing one project implementation
manual, though with some tensions and difference in
verification/counter-verification systems [32] and some
duplication (separate working groups on information
systems, for example).
In summary, RBF has brought some degree of benefits
to most parties, though few gains are unambiguous. For
example, while front line providers gained, they were
also subject to increased demands, as was also the case
for staff.
Impact on ownership structure and financing
In this section we examine whether and how RBF has
influenced ownership structures and financing flows for
health care in Zimbabwe. RBF channeled funding to the
public and mission PHUs and some first level hospitals,
but that this has not changed ownership structures
within the health sector, with the wider health market
more affected by economic changes, such as reduction in
municipal levies and challenges to the private insurance
market (see Table 4).
The original RBF scheme was budgeted at $2 per capita
[36] and a recent study estimated RBF’s incremental cost
at $3.19 per capita [37]. Overall RBF expenditure in 2015
across 60 districts was just over $18 million [22], while the
current annual budget for RBF across 60 districts is $22
million. In comparison with an estimated $69 per capita
public health spend [22] (including external aid but ex-
cluding out of pocket payments) and overall health needs,
RBF’s contribution looks small. However, compared to
public funding arriving at local levels, the amounts are
seen as significant by local actors.
‘The limited funding from the Government of
Zimbabwe is one of the main challenges. Health
facilities are 100% dependent on RBF’ (local KI)
There is no overall data on how RBF revenues were
used by facilities, but the impression of many key infor-
mants is that spending was initially quite focused on
infrastructure, including maternity waiting homes. Ex-
penditure on drugs has also been a main component,
partly because of problems in the national drugs supply,
which recent reforms of pharmaceutical supply and add-
itional funds from the Health Levy are meant to be ad-
dressing [22]. Other expenditures include medical
equipment, utilities, travel and subsistence (including to
collect quotations for procurement by the in-charges or
Health Centre Committee members). Some facilities
were reported to spend up to 20% of their RBF funds on
travel and subsistence, which is seen as excessive – the
MoHCC sent a guidance note in 2018 limiting this to a
maximum of 10% of RBF revenues.
From the HTF side, the funding was not additional, in
that resources were already committed to supporting the
primary care system before switching to RBF in 2014.
However, given restrictions on the Health Results
Innovation Trust Fund, it would be reasonable to regard
the World Bank funding as additional.
Overall, then RBF provided small but significant re-
sources for health care, which still fell far short of needs
even at primary care level.
Corruption and rent-seeking
The general perception of key informants was that cor-
ruption in Zimbabwe was a high-level phenomenon, not
one which pervaded the system, not least because of the
limited resource flows through it (with the bulk of pro-
curement handled by external agents).
RBF offered an attractive financing modality in the
context of lack of trust in government, channelling funds
into lower levels of the system. At the start there was
concern that this might increase corruption at PHU
level. However, this is perceived not to have occurred,
largely due to tight controls and also residual profession-
alism in the system. Most key informants felt that the
main risk of RBF was rather inefficiency, in terms of
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additional time required for procurement, purchasing
and reporting by in-charges, who are not only the man-
ager but also the main clinical person at clinic level. A
further issue was uncompetitive prices for items like
pharmaceuticals, if clinics are purchasing in small quan-
tities, rather than getting bulk procurement at a higher
level [22]. Lack of cash in the overall economy was an-
other factor delaying disbursements, peaking in 2017,
though this has now been mitigated by increased use of
‘plastic money’.
‘The day after being paid their subsidies, suppliers
would go to the clinics with three quotes, all on
different letterheads, with theirs the cheapest! But we
picked this up’ (national KI)
More generally, deeply rooted corruption remains a
challenge and is seen as having deteriorated over the
period because of the dire circumstances faced by the
country.
Impact on equity of service delivery
There has been a focus on creating an equitable health
system post-independence in Zimbabwe, despite wealth
inequalities. However, the economic crisis of the 2000s
led to widespread exclusion and increased financial bar-
riers. The 2013 Constitution commits Zimbabwe to en-
suring access to all for essential health care, though with
the proviso of it being within the limits of the resources
available to it [38]. RBF has contributed to an overall re-
turn to health system functionality, alongside other de-
velopment partner resources post-crisis.
‘RBF helped to accelerate Zimbabwe to get closer to
where it had been a decade earlier’ (national KI)
In relation to equity, RBF has an inherently equitable
design, in that it focuses on maternal and child health
outputs at primary level in rural areas, whose users are
more likely to be disadvantaged. The programme also
incorporates a remoteness bonus, although this is low in
practice, and most of the RBF revenues have been driven
by quantitative outputs, which largely reflect catchment
populations. This disadvantages more remote areas,
which typically have smaller catchment populations [22].
There were some indications of greater benefit to
poorer households in the 18 districts [30]. However, the
impact on financial barriers (changes to household out
of pocket payments) was not reported in the impact
evaluation, despite removal of user fees being a key goal
of RBF. In general, inequalities of access at the popula-
tion level remain38, with institutional delivery rates, for
example, roughly twice as high (90%) for the top quin-
tiles as the bottom (46%) [24].
Discussion
This study is the first to our knowledge to focus on
the political economy of RBF, particularly in relation
to how it alters distribution of resources in the health
sector. It has examined the case of Zimbabwe, one of
the few countries in Africa to have scaled up RBF na-
tionally and which has been neglected in published
academic literature to date. It adds to the limited
published evidence on political economy of health fi-
nancing reforms in low income countries [6, 8, 9, 39],
with even less attention having been paid to FCAS
settings, where by definition institutions are weaker
and liable to be even more vulnerable to power and
resource imbalances. In this case study, characteristics
of fragility, such as dependence on external resources
and actors, are exhibited, alongside atypical features
in fragile settings, such as institutional capacity to
resist or at least reform externally introduced
programmes.
In relation to our first question, on adoption, our
findings match some of other recent studies in the
regions which look at RBF policy adoption in
highlighting the important role of donors, in terms of
offering financial and ideational inducements [9, 11],
and also how crisis – in this case, economic and pol-
itical – was an important trigger. This is not unique
to RBF – external players have been influential in
previous health financing reforms [40], such as user
fee removal, although in that policy, domestic actors
were arguably much more dominant in adoption [41].
Contrasting with a recent set of studies on RBF scale-
up, the pilot phase did not play an important role
and there was limited influence of local policy entre-
preneurs [10]. In Zimbabwe, we also document the
ideological legacy of the post-colonial period and re-
sidual resources within the health system, despite
more than a decade of severe under-financing, and
how that contributed to modifying and adapting RBF
to what MoHCC staff saw as their own unique con-
text, in particular wanting to maintain a coherent sys-
tem. This led to more integrated implementation and
genuine ownership over time, despite initial resistance
to the RBF concept, at least amongst some key tech-
nical staff in the MoHCC, which may explain its
rapid scale up and enable its sustainability [10, 42] .
Other countries which have lacked the capacity to
push back on donor plans and to ensure aligned pol-
icies, such as Sierra Leone, have seen more start-stop
approaches to RBF [43]. A review of the use of RBF
in humanitarian settings also highlights the need for
adaptability to these very challenging contexts [39].
The contextual factors were key in the uptake of RBF
in Zimbabwe, especially the fiscal constraints. RBF was
initially seen as important to address staff retention and
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to address poor indicators, providing revenue to revital-
ise the health system. It was not conceived as a health
system reform or as a needed incentivisation from the
MoHCC side, but as funding was conditional on RBF
mechanisms, this was accepted. Later on, some came to
appreciate, however, that RBF was able to channel re-
sources effectively to frontline providers and also to pro-
vide more complete data on results [32]. There was also
a later retro-fitting of RBF into the RBM government
programme, which provided ideological coherence to de-
ployment of RBF in the health sector.
As documented in other settings [8, 9, 12], scientific
evidence was not the main driver of scale up of RBF:
from the MoHCC side, there was no demand for ro-
bust evidence prior to scale up as there was confi-
dence that any resource injection would be effective;
from the funder side, there was a perceived bias to-
wards positive results. In any case, scale up preceded
sharing of the impact evaluation. We note however
that this is not unique to RBF: a recent comparative
analysis of learning across low income health systems
found that the choice and application of evidence is
often “purpose-driven” and predefined by political
agendas [42].
In relation to our second question on implementation,
the MoHCC retained authority over decision-making,
however, the complexity of RBF programmes poses a
challenge, with our study and a related study of the ef-
fects of RBF on strategic purchasing highlighting the risk
of important technical decisions being decided in
smaller groups and merely being ratified by governing
bodies [44]. The discussion about ‘purity’ of the model
also raises the issue of trade-marking of concepts: while
some groups have historically had a very strong influ-
ence over the development of RBF in low and middle in-
come countries, it is clear that there are differing
understandings and applications across settings and in-
deed that some degree of local adaptation may be essen-
tial for the schemes’ success [8, 39] and to ensure that
RBF is not seen as a standalone programme.
In terms of impact on distribution of resources (our
third question), RBF, like any health financing reform,
does involves a shift in power and resources, but the
Zimbabwe case study does not suggest a major
change, perhaps because the health system was rela-
tively well developed prior to the crisis and retained
many of its structures and relationships. There was
some pay-off from RBF for those in top positions –
international prestige of presenting in international
meetings, for example – and equally, resistance from
others who were outside this group (for example,
managers working on programmes with different
funding modalities). This corresponds to the notion
of ‘pay for participation’ [12] whereby insider elites
are co-opted into support of policies. International
agencies which were contracted to operate RBF also
gained from developing expertise in RBF.
Most agreed that frontline facilities gained from in-
creased resources, although there appears to be a
paradox at the heart of RBF, as it simultaneously
passes resources and (potentially) control over those
resources to the periphery, while also using them as a
way of establishing control (using contracts, reporting,
verification and sanctions) to direct behaviour. In re-
lation to staff, the picture is mixed, which reflects
wider literature [45–47], with some clear benefits in
terms of funds to invest in working conditions but
also concerns in relation to equity of payments (pay-
ment by seniority, rather than performance) and ef-
fects on workload. Similarly, the impact on equity of
services is mixed, with the package of care potentially
favouring lower income households but the focus on
volume of services favouring facilities serving more
populated (typically less remote) areas. This is again a
feature shared by many other RBF programmes in Af-
rica and supports the argument that more focus on
equity analysis of RBF is required [48].
In terms of the resources which RBF brought to the
under-financed health system in Zimbabwe, this repre-
sented a small but significant (and partially additional)
increment in public resources for health, around 3% of
the estimated need per capita for an essential health care
package or 5% of available funding. Rather than provid-
ing an incentive, due to shortfall in the public budget it
was used as the main source of funding for non-salary
recurrent costs at PHU level, thus functioning as a core
financing mechanism [44] and supporting the improved
performance of the sector as a whole [30, 32]. Its future
role within the wider health financing landscape remains
unclear.
In relation to limitations of this study, our KI sample
was large but not comprehensive (partly because of field
work time but also due to the movement of participants
into new and less accessible posts). However, care was
taken to include most of the main stakeholders (people
holding relevant positions in the Ministry, development
partners, implementers and technical support roles) in
this policy, not just present but over its history. In some
cases, KI were time-limited so interviews had to focus
on a limited range of questions, also to reflect their
period of engagement with the policy. We also have to
bear in mind that stakeholders had specific positions,
reflecting institutional and personal interests, which we
took into account during analysis. Equally, many of the
documents which describe the process of policy
development and roll out are confidential or not avail-
able, so while the researchers tried to access as broad a
range of documents as possible, they could not be
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comprehensive. Finally, we note that this represents only
one case study, so any generalisation has to be cautious
while the body of evidence is built. Other countries will
need to examine whether their contextual factors are
similar to Zimbabwe’s in ways which make similar out-
comes likely.
The article also sheds light on how political econ-
omy analysis may need to be adapted to be usefully
applied to FCAS settings. While political economy in
higher income settings often focuses on the role of
politics, bureaucratic factions, interest groups and
beneficiary organisations in influencing policy devel-
opment and outcomes [49], in the Zimbabwe context,
these groups are less organised and influential, with
individual leadership, donor positions and small
amounts of marginal resource having disproportionate
influence. Participation by the population is typically
weak [30]. Organisations which can bring technical
and financial capacity to bear, for example by sup-
porting implementation, can play a very significant
role in the emergence and development of reforms.
Although these findings are specific to Zimbabwe,
they are likely to also apply in other low-income set-
tings - for example, fragile and conflict-affected set-
tings - although each presents a unique historical
case study, requiring careful analysis. The specific
configuration of ideological legacies from Zimbabwe’s
recent independence, for example (emphasising equity
goals), combine in this case with a health system re-
sidual capacity (which can resist externally imposed
models but can also deliver results) and a current fi-
nancial dependency on external resources to explain
the patterns of adoption, adaption and impact
identified.
Conclusion
This study highlights resource-seeking motivations for
adopting RBF in some low and middle income settings, es-
pecially fragile ones, but also the potential for local health
system actors to shape and adapt RBF to suit their needs
in some circumstances, where sufficient technical capacity
and institutional self-confidence exists. While this means
less structural disruption in the health system, it increases
the likelihood of an integrated approach and sustainability,
though resources remain a key constraint in Zimbabwe, as
in many health systems. We highlight the mix of auton-
omy and control which RBF can bring for frontline pro-
viders and argue for clearer understanding of the role that
RBF commonly plays in these settings – although it is por-
trayed as an incentive approach, it is functioning more as
the main provider payment mechanism for under-funded
primary care. Donor organisations and governments need
to clarify its role within the overall health financing
architecture.
Box 1 Looking ahead to institutionalisation
In 2018, an institutionalisation process started, with the 18 World Bank/
Cordaid districts moving from external management to management by
the Project Coordination Unit in the MoHCC – what one informant
called ‘baby steps towards re-establishing strategic purchasing in the MoH’
(national KI). During the initial period, staff were transferred from
Cordaid, to retain their expertise, and posts were externally financed.
The unit will be semi-independent within the MoHCC, reporting to the
Permanent Secretaries of the MoHCC and Ministry of Finance. This will
constitute a transition to internalisation of RBF, with the aim of full
transition by 2020.
It is clearly not evident as yet how well this will support performance
pressures and ensure regular payments to facilities, and many questions
remain open about local level RBF structures in future and whether or
how the intensive role of the field officers (in training, support,
verification, follow up and mentoring) will be replaced. Some have also
noted the need for a stronger central performance management unit in
the MoHCC, which could have oversight over RBF and also ensure its
fuller integration.
One crucial factor is whether the government is able to take over the
financing commitment for RBF, which currently has limited financial
security, with core funding from the World Bank stopping in 2018 and
the HDF under-financed. Ultimately greater Government of Zimbabwe
funding is needed for full ownership of RBF.
In principle, RBF could be extended to cover a full package of basic
services – absorbing indicators beyond reproductive, maternal and child.
In 2017 a few indicators on tuberculosis and antiretroviral therapy were
added, but with extremely low payments ($0.05 per TB case detection,
for example). Movement in this direction is currently dependent on
other donors ‘buying in’ to RBF to virtually pool funds and purchase
additional services which are delivered at PHUs and district hospitals.
Ideally, these priorities would include more local iteration to reflect
disease burdens. The current indicator list and prices are nationally
determined.
Longer term, a consensus needs to be reached on whether RBF’s main
function is to incentivise under-performing areas (i.e. providing a small,
targeted financing component) or to be the main channel for funding
non-salary recurrent costs at facility level. This remains unclear in the
draft National Health Care Financing Strategy [50] and key informants
also held divergent views on this. Most favoured a mixed payments
system, with base inputs for salaries, centrally procured drugs operating
on a pull system and RBF as an incentive only (in which case it could
reduce from $20–25 million per annum to an estimated $5 million). The
right level of incentives is unclear, but it could potentially be 10% of
salaries, with a higher level for managers [22]. At present it is covering
some of the core recurrent costs, but without better cost information, it
is not clear which or how much. It is simply providing additional
resources, which are gratefully received. The development of a national
health insurance system, if it occurs within the medium term (and
bearing in mind the challenges posed by the current low formal
employment rate), will also need to articulate with RBF, possibly
focusing on addressing affordability while RBF incentivises the supply
side for neglected services.
Endnotes
1SINA runs training courses and consultancies in RBF
design and management. It is based on very specific
design principles, which define a ‘pure’ RBF model.
http://www.sina-health.com/
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